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September 13, 2008, 0:00 a.m.

It Was Gibson’s Gaffe
Which made the smug condescension all the more precious.

By Charles Krauthammer

“Ms. Palin most visibly stumbled when she was asked by Mr. Gibson if she
agreed with the Bush doctrine. Ms. Palin did not seem to know what
he was talking about. Mr. Gibson, sounding like an impatient teacher, informed
her that it meant the right of ‘anticipatory self-defense.’ ”
New York Times, September 12
Informed her? Rubbish.

The Times got it wrong. And Charlie Gibson got it wrong.

There
is no single meaning of the Bush doctrine. In fact, there have been
four distinct meanings, each one succeeding another over the eight years
of this administration — and the one Charlie Gibson cited is not the one in common usage today.

He asked Palin, “Do you agree with the Bush doctrine?”

She responded, quite sensibly to a question that is ambiguous, “In what respect, Charlie?”

Sensing
his “gotcha” moment, Gibson refused to tell her. After making her fish
for the answer, he grudgingly explained to the moose-hunting rube that
the Bush doctrine “is that we have the right of anticipatory
self-defense.”

Wrong.

I know something about the subject because, as the Wikipedia entry on the Bush doctrine notes, I was the first to use the term. In the cover essay of the June 4, 2001, issue of The Weekly Standard
titled, “The Bush Doctrine: ABM, Kyoto, and the New American
Unilateralism,” I suggested that the Bush administration policies of
unilaterally withdrawing from the ABM treaty and rejecting the Kyoto
protocol, together with others, amounted to a radical change in foreign
policy that should be called the Bush doctrine.

Then came 9/11,
and that notion was immediately superseded by the advent of the war on
terror. In his address to Congress nine days later, Bush declared:
“Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day
forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will
be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.” This “with us or
against us” policy regarding terror — first deployed against Pakistan
when Secretary of State Colin Powell gave President Musharraf that
seven-point ultimatum to end support for the Taliban and support our
attack on Afghanistan — became the essence of the Bush doctrine.

Until
Iraq. A year later, when the Iraq War was looming, Bush offered his
major justification by enunciating a doctrine of pre-emptive war. This
is the one Charlie Gibson thinks is the Bush doctrine.

It’s
not. It’s the third in a series and was superseded by the fourth and
current definition of the Bush doctrine, the most sweeping formulation
of Bush foreign policy and the one that most distinctively defines it:
the idea that the fundamental mission of American foreign policy is to
spread democracy throughout the world. It was most dramatically
enunciated in Bush’s second inaugural address: “The survival of liberty
in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other
lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom
in all the world.”

This declaration of a sweeping,
universal American freedom agenda was consciously meant to echo John
Kennedy’s pledge that the United States “shall pay any price, bear any
burden . . . to assure the survival and the success of liberty.” It
draws also from the Truman doctrine of March 1947 and from Wilson’s 14
points.

If I were in any public foreign-policy debate today, and
my adversary were to raise the Bush doctrine, both I and the audience
would assume — unless my interlocutor annotated the reference otherwise —
that he was speaking about Bush’s grandly proclaimed (and widely
attacked) freedom agenda.

Not the Gibson doctrine of pre-emption.

Not the “with us or against us” no-neutrality-is-permitted policy of the immediate post-9/11 days.

Not the unilateralism that characterized the pre-9/11 first year of the Bush administration.

Presidential
doctrines are inherently malleable and difficult to define. The only
fixed “doctrines” in American history are the Monroe and the Truman
doctrines, which came out of single presidential statements during
administrations where there were few conflicting foreign-policy
crosscurrents.

Such is not the case with the Bush doctrine.

Yes,
Palin didn’t know what it is. But neither does Gibson. And at least she
didn’t pretend to know — while he looked down his nose and over his
glasses with weary disdain, “sounding like an impatient teacher,” as the
Times noted. In doing so, he captured perfectly the
establishment snobbery and intellectual condescension that has
characterized the chattering classes’ reaction to the phenom who
presumes to play on their stage.

Charles Krauthammer is a nationally syndicated columnist.

© 2008, The Washington Post Writers Group

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